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Credit and liquidity risks represent main channels of financial contagion for interbank lending
markets. On one hand, banks face potential losses whenever their counterparties are under distress
and thus unable to fulfill their obligations. On the other hand, solvency constraints may force banks
to recover lost fundings by selling their illiquid assets, resulting in effective losses in the presence
of fire sales—that is, when funding shortcomings are widespread over the market. Because of the
complex structure of the network of interbank exposures, these losses reverberate among banks
and eventually get amplified, with potentially catastrophic consequences for the whole financial
system. Building on Debt Rank [1], in this work we define a systemic risk metric that estimates
the potential amplification of losses in interbank markets accounting for both credit and liquidity
contagion channels: the Debt-Solvency Rank. We implement this framework on a dataset of 183
European banks that were publicly traded between 2004 and 2013, showing indeed that liquidity
spillovers substantially increase systemic risk, and thus cannot be neglected in stress-test scenarios.
We also provide additional evidence that the interbank market was extremely fragile up to the 2008
financial crisis, becoming slightly more robust only afterwards.
INTRODUCTION
The recent financial crises have highlighted the importance to properly assess systemic risk in capital markets. In
particular, both researchers and regulators realized that the financial system is actually more fragile than previously
thought, because of the complexity of interconnections between financial institutions [2–6], resulting both from direct
exposures to bilateral contracts and from indirect exposures to common assets [7–11]. Indeed, while interconnected-
ness means diversification and thus reduces individual risk, it can however increase systemic risk: financial distress can
spread between institutions through such exposures and propagate over the market, leading to amplification effects
like default cascades [12–14]. Thus, much attention is being devoted nowadays to characterize the emerging network
structure of financial markets from the viewpoint of systemic risk [15–18]—especially in terms of counterparty and
rollover risks caused by loans between institutions [19, 20]. Remarkably, the network-based approach allows to track
the reverberation of a credit event or liquidity squeeze throughout the financial system, with important outputs like
measures for potential capital losses and domino effect, and the identification of systemic and vulnerable institu-
tions [2]. The shortcoming of requiring data on individual exposures, which are often privacy-protected and thus
unaccessible, can be overcome by using either stylized banking systems (see, e.g., [18, 21]) or effective methods to
reconstruct the network structure from the available data [22] (usually, the balance sheet composition of financial
institution) [23–33].
Here we focus on the interbank lending market, where banks temporarily short on liquidity borrow money for a
specified term (mostly overnight) from other banks having excess liquidity, that in turn receive an interest on the
loan. This market plays crucial role in the financial system, by allowing banks to cope with liquidity fluctuations and
meet reserve requirements at the end of the trading day [34–36]. Because of its structure, the interbank market can be
properly represented as a directed weighted network, where interbank loans constitute the direct exposures between
banks and allow for the propagation of financial distress in the system through two main mechanisms [2, 18, 21]: credit
shocks and funding shocks. Credit losses are related to counterparty risk, and are faced by lender banks when their
borrower banks default and fail to fulfill their obligations. These losses can then lead to the default of lenders, resulting
in another wave of credit shocks. In a seminal paper, Eisenberg and Noe [37] developed an analytical framework to
determine the set of payments that clear the network given an initial shock, assessing in this way how losses propagate
through the system (see also [17, 38]). The Furfine algorithm [39] instead quantifies losses due to financial contagion
by iteratively propagating distress from a defaulted bank to its creditors. In contrast, in the Debt Rank algorithm [1]
credit shocks propagate also in the absence of defaults, provided that balance sheets are deteriorated: potential losses
in the equity of a borrower translate into the devaluation of interbank assets of the corresponding lender [40, 41]. In
this way Debt Rank accounts for the incremental build-up of distress in the system even before the occurrence of
defaults, and thus seems appropriate for stress-test scenarios [42].
Funding shocks are instead related to rollover risk, and concern financial institutions subject to regulatory solvency
constraints marking their assets to market in order to replace lost fundings [2, 43, 44]. If the interbank market is under
distress and shrinks, banks short on liquidity may be unable to borrow all the money they need from the market, and
be forced to sell their illiquid assets [45]. In the presence of fire sales, the market demand for illiquid assets becomes
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2inelastic, depressing the market prices of these assets and resulting in effective losses for banks [46, 47]. These fire sales
spillovers create the incentive to hoard liquidity [48, 49], which can in turn induce another wave of sales, activating a
liquidity spiral that can lead the interbank market to freeze completely [50–52]. Note that beyond a direct channel
(funding losses combined with cash-flow constraints), fire sales may also originate indirectly through common assets
holdings, or the leverage targeting policy adopted by banks [11, 42, 53]. In any event, liquidity spillovers were shown
to represent an important dimension of overall systemic risk, comparable to counterparty domino effects [38].
In this work we aim at combining these two channels of financial contagion into a systemic risk metric for the
spreading of potential losses in interbank markets. By doing so, we define the Debt-Solvency Rank, an extension
of the Debt Rank framework to such a credit-funding shock scenario [2]. We build on the assumption that equity
losses experienced by a bank do imply not only a decreasing value of its obligations, but also a decreasing ability to
lend money to the market—even if no default has occurred. Such financial distress then reverberates throughout the
market, turning into equity losses for other banks. We show that accounting for fire sales spillovers directly within
the distress propagation dynamics leads to a more refined assessment of systemic risk for interbank markets, where
liquidity issues represent a first-order correction to counterparty risk. We apply our method on a dataset of 183
European banks from 2004 to 2013, quantifying individual impact and vulnerability of these financial institutions
over time. Our analysis confirms that liquidity issues are important for a correct systemic risk assessment, their effect
being particularly relevant when credit risk peaks. We also provide additional evidence that the interbank market
was extremely fragile up to the 2008 financial crisis, becoming slightly more robust only afterwards.
DATA & METHODS
Balance sheets basics and the interbank network
In order to characterize the interbank market, we use the Bureau van Dijk Bankscope database1 that contains
yearly-aggregated balance sheets information of N = 183 large European banks, from 2004 to 2013. For each bank i
and for each year T (we omit the year label for convenience), the balance sheet composition summarizes the financial
position of the bank, and consists of assets with a positive economic value (loans, derivatives, stocks, bonds, real estate,
and so on) and of liabilities with a negative economic value (such as customer deposits, and debits). To disentangle
the interbank market from the overall financial system, we distinguish between interbank assets Ai (corresponding
to the total loans to other banks) and external (non-interbank) assets A˜i, and between interbank liabilities Li (the
total debts to other banks) and external (non-interbank) liabilities L˜i. The balance sheet identity for bank i defines
its equity Ei (or tier capital) as the difference between its total assets and liabilities:
Ei = (A˜i +Ai)− (L˜i + Li). (1)
A bank is solvent as long as its equity is positive. In fact, negative equity means insolvency, as the bank cannot pay
back its debs even by selling all of its assets. Here, following the literature on financial contagion [18, 19, 24], we take
insolvency as a proxy for default. In the following, we denote the overall equity of the interbank market as E =
∑
iEi,
and its total volume as C =
∑
iAi ≡
∑
i Li (see Table I).
For each bank i, its interbank assets and liabilities are aggregates of the individual loans to and borrowings from
other banks: Ai =
∑
j Aij and Li =
∑
j Lij , where Aij is the amount of the loan extended by bank i to bank j,
which represents an asset for bank i and a liability for bank j: thus Lji ≡ Aij ∀i, j. Hence, the interbank market
can be represented as a directed weighted network, in which links correspond to exposures between banks [54, 55].
However, because of privacy issues, we do not have information on the individual loans and obligations. Yet, we can
reconstruct the interbank network of exposures from aggregated interbank assets and liabilities by resorting to the
two-step inference procedure described in [32]2, which was shown to be particularly effective in assessing the presence
and extent of overnight interbank loans. In a nutshell, the method estimates individual exposures as:
Aij =
z−1 +Ai Lj
C
aij , aij =
{
1 with probability pij = (Ai Lj)/(z
−1 + Ai Lj)
0 otherwise
(2)
where z is a parameter that controls for the density of the network and aij denotes the presence of the link. Note
that the probabilistic nature of the connections is particularly fit to represent overnight positions: we assume that
1 Raw data are available from Bureau van Dijk: https://bankscope.bvdinfo.com. Refer to [42] for all the details about the handling of
missing data.
2 We set a network density of 10% and generate an ensemble of 1000 interbank networks. Results presented in this paper are averaged
over this ensemble.
3year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
total equity (E) 496976 900950 1207734 1542098 1291499 1680088 1708205 1629743 1699175 1778428
total volume (C) 1424469 2453230 3063762 3874003 3040012 2728253 2371510 2286400 2137298 2008040
TABLE I. Aggregate equity and volume of the interbank market (expressed in million USD) for the various years considered.
contracts are continuously placed and immediately resolved and rolled over, a scenario in which credit and liquidity
shocks can be assumed to hit the system and spread on the same temporal scale.
Credit & funding shocks
Having built the network of interbank exposures, we now describe the credit-funding shock dynamics on the in-
terbank market [2, 21] that will be at the basis of the Debt-Solvency Rank. Suppose a generic bank u is hit by an
exogenous shock (such as the sudden devaluation of its external assets) that causes u to become insolvent. This event
triggers a cascade of losses in the network, through two distinct processes.
1. Credit shock: bank u fails to meet its obligations, resulting in effective losses for its creditors. In particular, each
other bank j suffers a loss equal to λAju, where 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 indicates the amount of loss given default. Here we
consider only uncollateralized markets (i.e., without a central counterparty that guarantees for interbank loans),
and thus set λ = 1 always3
2. Funding shock: banks are unable to replace all the liquidity previously granted by u; this, in turn, triggers a
fire sale of assets. In particular, each other bank j can use its cash reserves to replenish only a fraction (1− ρ)
of the lost funding from u, and its illiquid assets trade at a discount (their market value is less that their book
value), so that j must sell assets worth (1 + γ)ρAuj in book value terms—corresponding to an overall loss of
γρAuj , where the parameter γ set the change in asset prices. In the following we will focus on two cases: ρ = 1,
meaning that banks actually cannot replace the lost funding from u and are thus forced to entirely replenish
the corresponding liquidity by assets sales; and ρ = 0, for which there are no funding shocks as banks always
have enough liquid assets to cope with these losses.
Overall, the generic bank j faces a loss of λAju+γρAuj (the first term appears if j is a lender of u, and the second one
if j is a borrower of u). Then, bank j also defaults if this loss exceeds Ej , and a new credit-funding shock propagates
through the market, resulting in a wave of cascade failures.
Before moving further, we discuss how to compute the coefficient γ that determines the losses due to funding
shocks. Following a common approach [11, 18, 58, 59], here we assume that assets fire sales generate a linear impact
on prices: given that Q = ρ
∑
j Auj is the aggregate amount of assets that need to be liquidated, we set the price
impact coefficient such that when Q = 0 the relative assets price change is ∆p/p = 0 (i.e., no devaluation), and when
Q = C it is ∆p/p = −1 (assets value vanishes). This results in a price impact ∆p/p = −Q/C.4 Finally, to obtain the
corresponding value of γ, it is sufficient to equate the relative loss γρ to the relative amount sold (1 + γ)ρ times the
relative assets price change (−∆p/p), obtaining γ = [C/Q− 1]−1.
The Debt-Solvency (DS) Rank
We are now equipped to apply the credit-funding shock scenario described above to the Debt Rank framework.
Before starting, we recall again the basic idea behind Debt Rank: the probabilities of banks default can be obtained by
iteratively spreading the individual banks distress levels weighted by the potential wealth affected [1]. In its original
formulation, Debt Rank considers counterparty risk in a network of long-term interbank loans (in physics terminology,
the network is said to be quenched). In this situation, liabilities stay at their face value, while assets are marked to
market. The microscopic dynamics of distress propagation then works as follows [40]. If a bank u is hit by a shock
and its equity decreases, also if u is still solvent the market value of its obligations decreases, because u is now “closer”
3 In the literature, λ is usually set in one of two ways: i) exogenously to a constant value, λ = 0.4 ÷ 0.45 [56]; ii) stochastically from a
distribution q(λ) [57]. The second approach reflects the fact that λ usually varies considerably, with a large portion of the probability
mass at 0% (collateralized loans) and at 100% (completely unsecured loans). Empirical studies [57] suggest to use a beta distribution
q(λ) = λα−1(1− λ)β−1 Γ(α+ β)/[Γ(α)Γ(β)], with shape parameters α = 0.28 and β = 0.35.
4 Note that the coefficient C−1 in our case is of order 10−13 (see Table I), meaning that 10bn euros of trading imbalances lead to a price
change of order ten basis points—in line with [11].
4to default and thus less likely to meet its obligation at maturity. This results in a loss on equity for the banks that
have u’s obligations in their balance sheet, which in turn decrease the market value of these banks obligations, and
so forth. Now, the Debt Rank assumes that relative changes of equity translate linearly into relative changes of asset
values, resulting in an impact of bank u on bank j equal to λΛju = λAju/Ej , where Λ is the interbank leverage
matrix [40, 42].5 Then, by iterating the described credit shocks dynamics, Debt Rank allows to compute the final
level of financial distress in the network.
In contrast, in the interbank market the majority of contracts have overnight duration, meaning that they are
placed and shortly after resolved and rolled-over: the network is said to be annealed, as links change continuously. In
this situation, liabilities also change and may lead to funding shocks. In line with the original Debt Rank approach,
we can assume that the ability of bank u to lend money to the market decreases proportionally to its equity, and that
the liabilities (borrowings) of other banks towards u change in the same way. As funding shocks results in effective
equity losses only in the presence of fire sales (i.e., when γ > 0), the impact of bank u on bank j in this case can be
assessed as ργΥju = ργAuj/Ej . Overall, the impact of bank u on bank j due to both counterparty creditworthiness
and liquidity shortage issues is λΛju+ργΥju. Importantly, we assume that these shocks happen on the same temporal
scale. In this way, we can extend the Debt Rank formulation to a dynamics where the equity decrease of bank u
causes an equity decrease both for the lenders of u because of credit shocks, and at the same time for the borrowers
of u because of funding shocks.
We can formalize the above discussion as follows. The dynamics of shock propagation consists of several rounds
{t}, and we are interested in quantifying the level of financial distress of each bank i and at each time step t, given by
the relative change of equity: hi(t) = 1− Ei(t)/Ei(0). By definition, hi = 0 when no equity losses occurred for bank
i, hi = 1 when that bank defaults, and 0 < hi < 1 for intermediate distress levels. At step t = 0, there is no distress
in the system, and thus hi(0) = 0 ∀i. At step t = 1, an exogenous shock hits the market causing a decrease of equity
for some banks; hence, the set {hi(1)} represents the initial condition of the dynamics. Subsequent values of h are
obtained by spreading this shock on the system, and writing up the equation for the evolution of banks equity [40].
By defining A(t) = {j : hj(t − 1) < 1} as the set of banks that have not defaulted up to time t (and thus can still
spread their financial distress), we assume that a generic bank j propagates shocks as long as it keeps receiving them,
i.e., provided that hj(t) > hj(t− 1). However, such a propagation is damped with a function D[(t− tj)/τ ], where tj
denotes the time step when bank j first becomes distressed, tj : hj(tj) > 0 and hj(tj − 1) = 0, and τ is the damping
scale. Overall, we get:
hi(t+ 1) = min
1, hi(t) + ∑
j∈A(t)
[λΛij + ργ(t)Υij ] [hj(t)− hj(t− 1)]D[(t− tj)/τ ]
 . (3)
In this expression, according to the discussion in the previous paragraphs, the individual impact of bank j on bank i at
step t is λΛij +ργ(t)Υij , where the fire sale devaluation factor depends on time as γ(t) = {C/[ρQ(t)]− 1}−1. The ag-
gregate amount of interbank assets potentially to be liquidated at t is in turn given by Q(t) =
∑
j∈A(t)
∑
k Ajk[hj(t)−
hj(t − 1)]D[(t − tj)/τ ]. Concerning the damping function, note that for generic bank j it plays a role only when
t ≥ tj , as otherwise hj(t) = hj(t − 1) = 0. Importantly, it must have the properties D(0) = 1 and D(x) x→∞−−−→ 0:
the spreading is damped more and more with the propagation step, and eventually vanishes. An exponential shape
D[(t − tj)/τ ] = exp[−(t − tj)/τ ] satisfies these properties, but alternative forms can be used as well. The damping
scale τ sets the mean lifetime of the spreading. In the limit τ → 0, we have exp[−(t− tj)/τ ]→ δ(t− tj): banks spread
their distress only once, as in the original version of Debt Rank [1]. In the opposite limit τ →∞, exp[−(t−tj)/τ ]→ 1:
banks always propagate received shocks until they default, as in the most recent version of Debt Rank [40].
The above described dynamics stops at t∗ when no more banks can propagate their distress, i.e., hi(t∗) = hi(t∗−1)
∀i. The overall Debt-Solvency (DS) Rank of the network is then obtained as:
DS(t∗) =
∑
i
[hi(t
∗)− hi(1)]νi ≡ E(1)− E(t
∗)
E(0)
, (4)
where νi = Ei(0)/
∑
j Ej(0) = Ei(0)/E(0) is the relative importance of bank i in the system, and E(t) =
∑
iEi(t)
is the total equity of the system at time t. DS(t∗) thus represents the amount of equity that is potentially at risk
in the system, given an initial shock {hi(1)}. Note that the original Debt Rank accounting only for credit shocks is
recovered for λ = 1 and ρ = 0.
5 The same approach can be extended to non-linear impact functions [41]
5RESULTS
Group DS Rank
We first consider the simplest case of an initial shock to the system corresponding to a fixed percentage (1− ψ) of
equity loss for each bank: Ei(1) = (1−ψ)Ei(0) ∀i. Thus, hi(1) ≡ ψ ∀i and DS(t∗) = 1−ψ−E(t∗)/E(0). Concerning
the dynamics of shock propagation, we can easily study two limiting cases.
• When ψ ' 0, we can safely assume that no bank has failed after the first propagation step: hi(2) < 1 ∀i. We
thus have hi(2) = ψ{1 +
∑
j [λΛij + ργ(1)Υij ]} ∀i and, after some algebra, DS∗no−fail = ψC[λ + ργ(1)]/E(0),
where γ(1) = ρψ/(1 − ρψ). For τ → 0, the dynamics stops at this stage as banks have already spread their
distress once. For τ > 0, instead, the dynamics goes on and eventually banks start to default.
• When ψ ' 1, all banks will ultimately fail after some rounds of distress propagation. In general, if at t = t∗
each bank has failed, we get hi(t
∗) = 1 ∀i and E(t∗) = 0, so that DS∗full−fail = 1− ψ.
Figure 1 shows the results of the group DS dynamics for two temporal snapshots of our dataset: 2008 (the year
of the global financial crisis) and 2013 (the most recent year at our disposal). Panels (a) summarize the stationary
profile of DS as a function of the initial shock ψ. Let us first consider the case τ = 0 of banks spreading their distress
only once. As expected, for ψ ' 0 the system is close to the configuration of DS∗no−fail with no bank defaults.
Then, as ψ increases, the overall equity loss grows, and after reaching its maximum value DS(t∗) converges to the
DS∗full−fail configuration with all bank defaults. The clear effect of liquidity shocks is that of increasing equity
losses (especially in correspondence of the peak), and making the dynamics converge to DS∗full−fail for smaller initial
shocks. Equity losses are however much heavier when subsequent rounds of shock propagation are allowed. In the
extreme case τ → ∞, strikingly for year 2008 the dynamics converge to DS∗full−fail even if the initial distress is
very small. By contrast, for year 2013 some banks survive, indicating a higher resilience of the system to financial
distress. In any case, the dynamics needs more rounds to converge for small values of ψ, as shown in panels (b),
and the fire sale devaluation factor γ eventually assumes values close to 1, as shown in panels (c): large fire sales are
triggered at least once during the evolution of the system. By denoting the stationary value of DS Rank for a given
value of ρ as DS[ρ](t∗), we see from panels (d) that the progressive effect of liquidity shocks, given by the difference
∆[ρ]DS(t∗) = DS[ρ](t∗) −DS[0](t∗) is almost linear in ρ, and can reach values up to 0.3 for ρ = 1. Finally, in order
to gain insights on the reason why the resilience of the interbank market changed so significantly between the two
considered years, we study the interbank leverage matrix, whose spectral properties determine the stability of the
shock propagation dynamics [40]. By definition, the interbank leverage ratio of a bank i is given by Λi =
∑
j Λij .
Such value determines the bank resilience to credit shocks in the interbank market [40], with Λi < 1 representing the
“safety” condition for which that bank has enough capital to cover the losses due to the simultaneous defaults of all
its debtor banks. Here, in order to account also for liquidity shocks, we introduced an extended interbank leverage
ratio λΛi + ρΥi, where Υi =
∑
j Υij and γ = 1 according to the analysis of panels (c). The shape of the probability
distributions of original and extended leverage ratios in the banking system, shown in panels (e), reveals how these
values were much higher in 2008 than in 2013, resulting in a more fragile system in the previous case. Indeed, since
the breakdown of the interbank market at the global financial crisis, some banks started to adopt a precautionary
hoarding policy (due to concerns about future liquidity needs), and other banks in turn responded to the liquidity
hoarding of others by adopting the same behavior [48, 50]. While precautionary motives still affect the interbank
market nowadays (its total volume being steadily decreasing since 2007, see Tab. I), the resulting reduced leverage
ratios resulted in a more stable system.
While detailed results for other years can be found in the supplementary material, we can grasp the general systemic
risk properties of the interbank market over the time span considered (2004-2013) from Figure 2, which shows color
maps of the stationary group DS values for the various years and as a function of the initial shock ψ. For τ = 0,
DS(t∗) keeps its “inverse U” shape for all years. Yet, while in the absence of liquidity shocks systemic risk substantially
decreases after 2008, these shocks do lead to an increase in equity losses that shows up especially in late years. A
similar behavior is observed even more clearly for τ → ∞, as in this case the distance from the full-fail scenario
after 2008 is dramatically reduced by the presence of liquidity shocks. Overall, these results point to the importance
of considering liquidity shocks when assessing potential equity losses in the financial system. Notably, after 2008
liquidity risk has become more prominent for higher values of the initial shock: in complex network terminology, the
system has become more robust for low ψ, yet more fragile for high ψ.
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FIG. 1. Detailed results of group DS Rank for years 2008 (upper panels) and 2013 (lower panels). (a) Stationary value
DS(t∗) as a function of the initial shock ψ, in the cases of maximal or vanishing strength of liquidity shocks (ρ = 1 or ρ = 0,
respectively) and of instantaneous or vanishing damping of shocks (τ = 0 and τ =∞, respectively). (b,c) Temporal dynamics
of the system: DS and fire sale devaluation factor γ as a function of ψ for various iteration steps t, in the setting with liquidity
shocks ρ = 1 and multiple shocks propagation τ =∞. (d) Progressive effect of liquidity shocks: difference ∆[ρ]DS(t∗) between
DS[ρ](t∗) (when banks must sell illiquid assets for a fraction ρ of the lost funding) and DS[0](t∗) (when no liquidity shocks
occur), for ψ maximizing the overall equity loss. (e) Probability distributions of banks leverages Λ (black diamonds) and Λ + Υ
(blue circles), with relative median given by a dashed vertical line.
Individual DS Rank
We now move to the case in which the initial shock to the market corresponds to the failure of an individual bank
u: Eu(1) = 0⇒ hu(1) = 1 and Ei(1) = Ei(0)⇒ hi(1) = 0 ∀i 6= u. To make this initial condition explicit, we use the
notation X(t|u) for the value of a generic quantity X at step t an when u is the initially shocked bank. We thus have
DS(t∗|u) = 1− E(t∗|u)/E(0)− νu. Using this framework, we can compute two bank-specific risk indicators:
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FIG. 2. Heat maps of group DS(t∗) as a function of ψ and of the year. Upper plots refer to the case of no damping (τ =∞)
and lower plots to the case of instantaneous damping (τ = 0). Then, from left to right, plots show DS(t∗) with liquidity shocks
and ρ = 1, no liquidity shocks ρ = 0, and the difference between these values.
• Impact I, given by the relative equity loss experienced by the market after the initial default of that bank:
Iu = 1− E(t
∗|u)
E(1)
=
E(0)− Eu(0)− E(t∗|u)
E(0)− Eu(0) =
DS(t∗|u)
1− νu .
• Vulnerability V , namely the relative equity loss for that bank averaged over the initial defaults of all other banks:
Vu =
〈
Eu(0)− Eu(t∗|j)
Eu(0)
〉
j 6=u
= 〈hu(t∗|j)〉j 6=u .
Figure 3 shows scatter plots of impact and vulnerability of individual banks again for years 2008 and 2013 (plots
corresponding to other years can be found in the supplementary material). First note that, as expected, vulnerability
clearly increases with the leverage ratio of the bank, whereas, impact is more related to the bank size (as measured by
its initial equity). According to our data, interestingly the banks with the highest leverage have relatively small size,
and despite being very vulnerable they lack the potential to affect the market significantly. Concerning the different
shock propagation scenarios, in general we observe that the systemic impact of banks drops significantly from 2008
to 2013, while the decrease of systemic vulnerability is less evident but for multiple shock propagation τ → ∞. The
effect of liquidity shocks is in turn that of increasing both measures. In particular, in year 2013 these shocks cause
an increase of 100% (for τ = 0) and of 50% (for τ → ∞) for the impact of the largest banks, again underlying the
importance of fire sale spillovers for a more robust assessment of systemic risk.
We conclude by remarking that, according to our analysis, impact indeed correlates with size but is not a monotonic
function of it: some banks can be more impactful on the system than others with larger equity (or leverage). Thus,
the characteristics of the interbank network are important to determine the extent of financial contagion: with respect
to banking systems regulation, relying on balance sheet constraints may be insufficient, and should be supplemented
by considerations for the structure of the network [21].
DISCUSSION
In this work we have focused on the interbank lending market, the network of financial interlinkages resulting from
overnight loans between banks. This network represent an important sector of the whole financial system in terms of
traded volumes [60], and is crucial for banks to cope with liquidity fluctuations and meet reserve requirements [36].
In spite of its role, the interbank market is quite fragile, as intrasystem cash fluctuations alone have the potential
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FIG. 3. Scatter plot of impact and vulnerability values for each bank in years 2008 (upper panels) and 2013 (lower panels), in
the cases of maximal or vanishing strength of liquidity shocks (ρ = 1 or ρ = 0, respectively) and of instantaneous or vanishing
damping of shocks (τ = 0 and τ = ∞, respectively). The size of the bubble is non-linearly proportional to the initial equity
of the corresponding bank: sizei = 10
−2√Ei(0)/2. The color of the contour is instead given by the value of the generalized
leverage λΛi + ρΥi.
9to lead to systemic defaults [60], and exceptional external shocks can lead the market to a complete drought [3].
In order to quantify potential equity losses in interbank markets resulting from exogenous shocks, building on Debt
Rank [1], here we have defined a systemic risk metric that combines the dynamics of credit and liquidity shocks
propagation [2]: the Debt-Solvency Rank. By applying this framework to a dataset of 183 European banks from
2004 to 2013, we have showed that fire sale spillovers do increase the overall equity loss by a factor up to 50%, and
almost double the individual systemic impact of banks—especially in years after 2008. All these evidences point to the
importance of considering liquidity risk in network-based stress tests. We also document that the interbank market
was extremely fragile also before 2008, as in those years even the smallest initial shock would have caused all banks to
default (provided no taming of shocks propagation). By contrast, after the crisis the market became able to absorb
an increasing amount of financial distress.
In our framework, fire sales occur as banks sell their illiquid assets to recover lost fundings, and these sales happen
simultaneously with the propagation of credit and funding shocks. In this respect, our approach is different from [42],
where fire sales occur only after the distress propagation process and because of the target leverage policy adopted
by banks. Note also that in our model we consider assets sales solely by banks, but these spillovers are likely to
trigger additional sales by other financial institutions, which would depress prices even more. In this respect, in
principle the DS Rank could be combined with the aggregated vulnerability framework of [11, 53] in order to consider
liquidity contagion through both direct exposures and common asset holdings. Additionally, we have not considered
in our model any liquidity hoarding behavior for banks. Overall, the effect of funding shocks might be much more
relevant than what can be assessed through the DS Rank alone. Still, our approach can provide a useful lower bound
for the potential impact of these shocks on the financial system, and indirectly on the real economy [61] (as banks
suffering from liquidity shortages end up reducing their investments and affecting the economic growth). In any event,
our analysis supports the thesis that liquidity requirements on financial institutions may be as effective as capital
requirements in hindering contagious failures [18, 43].
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